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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
78-2-2(3) (j), 78-2-2(4), and 78-2a-3 (2) (j) . 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS 
This appeal arises from the district court's entry of 
summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' first and second causes of 
action and from the district court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' 
third cause of action for failure to prosecute. 
Summary judgment is reviewed for correctness without 
deference to the district court. Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 
947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997). Summary Judgment is proper only 
when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Id. 
A district court's dismissal for failure to prosecute is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Charlie Brown Constr. co. v. 
Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ct.App.), cert denied, 
765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). The district court has broad 
discretion in dismissing actions for failure to prosecute and 
that decision will not be disturbed without an abuse of 
discretion and a likelihood injustice has occurred. Hartford 
Leasing Corp. v. State of Utah, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah App. 
1994); Charlie Brown Constr. Co., 740 P.2d at 1370. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
There is no constitutional provision, statute or rule which 
is controlling. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below. 
The Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Defendant Limb and 
Defendant Tylers alleging three causes of action: 1) that an 
equitable mortgage was created by the parties entitling the 
Plaintiffs to "an unforeclosed equity of redemption," (See 
Appellants' Brief at page 26); 2) that the Tylers breached an 
agreement in which "in exchange for Tylers' agreement to pay the 
Plaintiffs the sum of $20,000, the Plaintiffs agreed to 
relinquish their interest" in the properties, (See Appellants' 
Brief at page 21); and 3) that Tylers breached an agreement to 
pay to the Plaintiffs $20,000 for a certain water right related 
to the properties. R. at 382-94. 
The Tylers and Limb each filed a motion for summary judgment 
concerning the first and second causes of action, which the court 
granted. R. at 539-59, 590-96, 660-75 Fourteen months later, 
Limb filed a Motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' remaining claims 
for failure to prosecute, which the court granted. R. at 697-
99, 715. The Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment, which the court denied. R. at 726-29, 782. 
The Plaintiffs appeal the court's grant of summary judgment 
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on the first two causes of action and attack the court's decision 
to dismiss the third cause of action for failure to prosecute. 
R. at 773-74, 792-93. Although the Plaintiffs suggest that the 
court erred in denying their Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, 
the Plaintiffs fail to brief this issue or offer any legal 
support for the allegation. See Appellants' Brief at 28-31. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1987, the Tylers agreed to loan the Plaintiffs $26,500.00 
and the Plaintiffs agreed to transfer to the Tylers by warranty 
deed three parcels of property in Washington County. R. at 62, 
543-44, 884. In conjunction with this transaction, the 
Plaintiffs agreed to make monthly payments for a year to repay 
the loan. R. at 62, 543-44, 884. In 1988, the parties agreed 
to extend by two years the time for repaying the first loan. R. 
at 545. At the same time, the Tylers also agreed to make a 
second loan to the Plaintiffs in the amount of $30,000.00. R. 
at 63, 73, 544-45. In return, the Plaintiffs transferred by 
warranty deed one additional piece of property in Washington 
County. R. at 73, 544-45. In conjunction with this 
transaction, the Plaintiffs agreed to make monthly payments for 
two years to repay the loan. R. at 63, 73, 544-45. In these 
transactions, the parties agreed that the Tylers would retain 
ownership of the properties if the Plaintiffs defaulted. R. at 
544, 991-92, 1009-10. The Plaintiffs defaulted on both loans. 
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R. at 1014-16. 
In 1989, the Plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy. R. at 1016. 
The Plaintiffs listed as part of their bankruptcy estate an 
interest in the four parcels of property (hereinafter the 
"properties") deeded to the Tylers in 1987 and 1988. R. at 
1016-18. In June, 1990, the Plaintiffs and the Tylers entered 
into a stipulation, filed with the bankruptcy court, in which the 
parties agreed to list the properties for sale for 21 months. R. 
at 1254, 1021-27. The proceeds from the sale would be used to 
repay the Tylers the money borrowed plus interest and costs and 
the remaining balance of the sale would be made a part of the 
bankruptcy estate. R. at 1254, 1021-27. The Plaintiffs' 
attorney negotiated the stipulation with the Tylers, who were not 
represented by counsel, and also drafted the document. R. at 
1208-09, 1021. The parties agreed that in the event the 
properties were not sold within 21 months, the Plaintiffs would 
withdraw all claims to the properties, the Tylers would retain 
sole ownership of the properties, and the Plaintiffs would 
automatically lose their right to the overages from any sale in 
the future. R. at 1254, 1021-27. The Plaintiffs, not the 
Tylers, insisted on the stipulation.. R. at 1208-09, 1021. 
Eight months after the stipulation was executed, the 
Plaintiffs wanted to free the properties from the bankruptcy 
court's control so that the properties could be sold and the 
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Plaintiffs could receive the overages, if any, without making the 
money available to their creditors. R. at 1041-43, 1047. As 
part of their scheme, the Plaintiffs wrote a letter to the 
bankruptcy trustee requesting the trustee release the properties 
because they had no interest in the properties. R. at 901, 
1047, 1049-53. Simultaneously, the Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte 
Motion requesting the bankruptcy court release the properties to 
the Tylers because the Tylers were the sole owners of the 
properties free from any legal claims by the Plaintiffs. R. at 
902-03, 1047, 1049-53. 
Six months after the Plaintiffs filed their Ex Parte Motion, 
the Tylers filed a Request for Abandonment of the properties. R. 
at 95. Following an investigation of the matter, and after 
providing the Plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard on the 
matter, the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the properties, 
concluding that the Plaintiffs had no interest in the properties 
and therefore, the properties should not be part of the 
bankruptcy estate. R. at 95. One month after the properties 
were abandoned, the Tylers sold the properties to Limb for 
$90,000.00. R. at 1154. The Tylers provided Limb warranty 
deeds for the properties. R. at 550-51. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that summary judgment 
against the Plaintiffs' claims was available on any one of three 
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legal grounds: 1) judicial estoppel; 2) abrogation of mortgage; 
and 3) waiver and estoppel. In addition, although not relied 
upon by the trial court, the doctrine of unclean hands bars 
Plaintiffs' claims. It is clearly established that summary 
judgment should be affirmed on any legal basis available to the 
district court, even if not relied upon by the district court in 
granting summary judgment. See Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp, 
836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992). 
First, judicial estoppel prevents the Plaintiffs from now 
claiming a right of redemption in the properties when they 
knowingly took a contrary position before the bankruptcy court. 
If they were permitted to claim such an interest now after 
disclaiming all interest before the bankruptcy court, a fraud 
upon the bankruptcy court would result, as well as a fraud on the 
creditors of the bankruptcy estate. 
Second, the Plaintiffs and the Tylers changed the nature of 
their conveyance from an alleged mortgage to an absolute deed by 
subsequent agreement. By agreement, the Plaintiffs extinguished 
their interest in the properties, including a right of 
redemption, securing only a right to overages, if any, if a sale 
occurred within 21 months. The Plaintiffs cannot now reassert an 
equity of redemption. 
Third, the parties' subsequent agreement operated as a 
waiver of the Plaintiffs' right to redeem. The doctrine of 
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estoppel operates to prevent the Plaintiffs from reasserting a 
right to redeem where the Tylers and Limb relied on the 
Plaintiffs' waiver of that right. 
Finally, Utah courts have uniformly held that a party 
seeking equity must do equity. The Plaintiffs' claim to an 
equity of redemption of the properties sounds in equity. In the 
bankruptcy proceedings, the Plaintiffs disclaimed all interest in 
the properties, including an equity of redemption, succeeding in 
freeing the properties from the bankruptcy court's control. The 
Plaintiffs now claim their disclaimer was a ruse to free the 
properties. Principles of equity bar the Plaintiffs from 
maintaining a claim for an equity of redemption. 
With respect to the district court's dismissal for failure 
to prosecute, the Plaintiffs have not offered any evidence 
demonstrating an abuse of discretion. The record contains 
substantial support for the district court's decision to dismiss 
for failure to prosecute. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
THE TYLERS WAS PROPER 
The trial court correctly concluded that summary judgment 
against the Plaintiffs' claims was available on any one of three 
legal grounds: 1) the Plaintiffs were judicially estopped from 
7 
asserting a right of redemption because they disclaimed any 
interest in the properties in the prior bankruptcy proceedings; 
2) even if the original conveyance to the Tylers was a mortgage, 
the Plaintiffs and the Tylers, by subsequent agreement, changed 
the character of the conveyance to an absolute deed; and 3) the 
Plaintiffs waived their right to redeem the properties and 
therefore, cannot now reassert that interest. On appeal, the 
Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that the material 
facts are disputed, or that the court incorrectly applied these 
legal rules to the material facts. 
Further, principles of equity bar the Plaintiffs claims. 
Utah courts have uniformly held that a party who seeks equity 
must also do equity. Although the court did not rely on this 
legal theory when entering summary judgment, it is clearly 
established that summary judgment should be affirmed on any legal 
basis available to the district court, even if not relied upon by 
the district court in granting summary judgment. See Town of 
Alta v. Ben Hame Corp, 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992). 
A. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ESTOPPED FROM 
ASSERTING AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTIES. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a person from 
taking a position that is inconsistent with a position taken in 
prior judicial proceedings. Utah courts have held that: 
[a] person may not, to the prejudice of another person deny 
any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between 
the same persons or their privies involving the same 
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subject-matter, if such prior position was successfully 
maintained. 
Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp.. 913 P.2d 731, 734 
(Utah 1995) (citing Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 
102 Utah 509, 515, 132 P.2d 388, 390 (1942)). 
The purpose of judicial estoppel is "to uphold the sanctity of 
oaths, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the judicial process 
from conduct such as knowing misrepresentations or fraud on the 
court." Id. at 734 (citing Wiese v. Wiese. 699 P.2d 700, 704-05 
(Utah 1985) (Durham, J., dissenting); and Total Petroleum. Inc. 
v. Davis. 822 F.2d 734, 737 n.6 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
In this case, it is undisputed that during the bankruptcy 
proceedings the Plaintiffs took the position that they had 
absolutely no interest in the properties. R. at 1041-43, 1047-
51. On February 11, 1991, the Plaintiffs wrote a letter to the 
bankruptcy trustee disclaiming all interest in the properties. 
Simultaneously, the Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Motion to 
release the properties to the Tylers confirming the Tylers are 
the sole owners of the property free from any claims by the 
Plaintiffs. R. at 1041-43, 1047-51. 
The Plaintiffs now take a position regarding the properties 
completely contrary to the position they took in the bankruptcy 
court. The Plaintiffs claim they are not estopped from 
maintaining an interest in the properties because the Tylers did 
not rely on the statements to the bankruptcy trustee and to the 
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bankruptcy court. The Plaintiffs argue that because the Tylers 
drafted a letter upon which the Plaintiffs patterned their letter 
to the bankruptcy trustee, they are somehow prevented from 
relying on the Plaintiffs' statements to the bankruptcy trustee 
and to bankruptcy court. Bare allegations alone are insufficient 
to withstand a summary judgment motion. See Dwiggins v. Morgan 
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991). 
Here, the letter only demonstrates that the Tylers were 
aware of the basis of the Plaintiffs' disclaimer of interest— 
that because the Plaintiffs defaulted, the Tylers obtained sole 
ownership in the properties free from any claims by the 
Plaintiffs. The letter does not indicate that the Tylers were 
aware of any possible legal claim the Plaintiffs could have made 
to the property. In fact, Mr. Tyler's deposition testimony 
clearly contradicts such a contention: 
Q. Okay. Mr. Tyler, do you understand that when real 
estate is pledged as security for the payment of an 
obligation, that those people who pledged theat real estate 
have the right to redeem that real estate within a certain 
period of time, even though they may default on their 
obligation? 
A. No. My understanding is that when they default in 
four or five ways over a long period of time, I feel just 
like Mary Anne, I told you here a few minutes ago, the 
property is theirs. 
Q. So you are not aware of any legal principle 
protecting the person who pledges the property? 
MR. RUSSELL: Objection. Calls for a legal conclusion 
from the witness. 
MR. PENDLETON: I'm not asking him for a 
conclusion. I'm asking if he's aware of any legal 
principle. 
MR. RUSSELL: And it's argumentative. 
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THE WITNESS: Not that I know of, I guess. I don't 
know. 
R. at 1222. 
In addition, Plaintiff Penn Smith's own deposition testimony 
demonstrates the Tylers were not privy to a scheme by the 
Plaintiffs to defraud the bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy 
trustee. The following excerpts from Plaintiff Penn Smith's 
deposition demonstrates that to advance a scheme to defraud the 
bankruptcy court and the bankruptcy trustee, the Plaintiffs took 
advantage of the Tylers' genuine belief of ownership in the 
properties: 
Q. Now, is it correct the reason you were sending 
this letter to Mr. Gillman [the bankruptcy trustee] was to 
convince him to have the properties released out of the 
bankruptcy? 
A. The purpose I wrote this letter was because we had 
been converted to a Chapter 7 involuntarily, and I was 
trying to get out of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy. And I was 
trying to get everything I could out of the Chapter 7 
bankruptcy, and that's essentially why I wrote the letter. 
Between what Mr. Tyler and I discussed he would do if he did 
send this letter, it fit in with me trying to get out of the 
bankruptcy, which I finally succeeded in doing. 
Q. My question was the reason you sent this to Mr. 
Gillman was to convince him to have these particular parcels 
of property taken out of your bankruptcy? 
A. That's correct. 
R. at 1047. 
Q. And at the top it says, Comes now the Debtor in 
propria persona and moves the Court release the real 
property belonging to R. H. Tyler and I. W. Tyler out of the 
bankruptcy. Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And the reason you filed this document, again, was 
so that the Bankruptcy Court would release the property 
from the bankruptcy to the Tylers? 
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A. That's correct. 
at 1049. 
Q. Well, did you make any disclosures to the 
Bankruptcy Court when you filed this motion to release the 
properties to the Tylers that you still claimed some 
interest in it? 
A. I didn't make any disclosure to that effect that I 
can see. 
Q. In fact, you didn't tell the bankruptcy trustee 
that you still claimed an interest in the property? 
A. I filed a claim of interest in it in the beginning 
of the bankruptcy. 
Q. Right. But then you asked the bankruptcy — 
A. To release it. 
Q. — to release it because you didn't claim an 
interest anymore? 
A. I didn't say I didn't claim an interest in it. I 
didn't say I did. I didn't say I didn't. 
Q. Let me refer you back to Exhibit 15. The second 
to last paragraph -- we went over this a minute ago -- but 
it says, We now know that the advice we received from Mr. 
Petty to include these properties in our bankruptcy was bad 
advice for we really had no claim to them. Do you see that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. So that statement was not true? 
A. Well, it evidently wasn't. It doesn't look like 
it. It looks like to me it was a mistake or error. 
t 1050-51. 
Q. My question goes to whether you had a claim to the 
property or not because this says that you had no claim to 
the property. And I want to know whether that statement is 
true or not. 
A. I believe I had a claim to the property. I'll 
have to tell you that. I believe I had a claim to the 
property ever since I first borrowed money on the property. 
Q. After you sent this letter of February 11, 1991, 
to Mr. Gillman you never indicated to the Bankruptcy Court 
or to Mr. Gillman that you still had a -- you still made a 
claim to the property; is that correct? 
A. I believe at that time I had already filed to 
dismiss the petition, and I was trying in all ways I knew, 
being a pro se litigant and not being lawyer trained, to get 
it dismissed out of the bankruptcy, and this is one of the 
vehicles I was trying to use. 
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R. at 1052. 
Plaintiff Penn Smith's testimony demonstrates that the 
Plaintiffs' written statements to the bankruptcy court were not 
simply "a layman's expression of a legal opinion,." (See 
Appellants' Brief at 16) but, rather, they were part of a scheme 
devised by the Plaintiffs to defraud the bankruptcy court. The 
testimony also demonstrates Plaintiff Penn Smith's willingness to 
lie or equivocate to get what he wants. Finally, the testimony 
demonstrates that the Tylers were not privy to Plaintiffs' 
scheme. 
In reliance upon the Plaintiffs' representations, the Tylers 
sold the properties to Limb.1 R. at 1154, 1223, 1224-26. The 
Tylers reliance on the Plaintiffs' representations is evidenced 
by the Tylers' use of warranty deeds to transfer the property to 
Limb. The Tylers' reliance was genuine. 
Because the Plaintiffs knowingly disclaimed all interest in 
the properties, they are estopped from reasserting an interest. 
If they were permitted to claim such an interest now, they would 
succeed in committing a fraud upon the bankruptcy court as well 
]The properties were sold for $90,000.00, which was only $3,500,00 less than the value 
attributed to the properties by Sam Sampson, the Plaintiffs' nephew, who was appointed by the 
bankruptcy court to list the properties for sale. See letter from Sam Sampson dated May 1, 1991, 
which is attached in Appendix 1. His valuation was based on the highest offers made on the 
properties over a long period of time, but which could not be accepted and consummated because 
of the bankruptcy proceedings. See Sam Sampson letter, Appendix 1. The properties did not sell 
for enough to even pay the debt in full to the Tylers. R. at 920. 
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as a fraud on the creditors of the bankruptcy estate. As the 
trial court concluded, the Plaintiff's deposition testimony 
clearly shows that judicial estoppel is necessary here to prevent 
a fraud on the bankruptcy court. R. at 660-75. 
The foregoing material facts are undisputed. As a matter of 
law, judicial estoppel prevents the Plaintiffs from disavowing 
their prior representations to the bankruptcy court. Summary 
judgment against the Plaintiffs was, therefore, proper. 
B. AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFFS CHANGED THE NATURE OF THE 
CONVEYANCE TO A DEED ABSOLUTE, BARRING A CLAIM FOR AN 
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTIES. 
Where parties enter into a mortgage in the form of a deed 
absolute, they may subsequently abrogate the mortgage by 
agreement: 
The general rule is that where a mortgage is in the form of 
a deed absolute or a conditional sale, the parties may by a 
subsequent agreement abandon the debt, cancel the agreement 
to reconvey, and thus change the character of the 
transaction from that of a mortgage to that of an absolute 
conveyance; and although there is authority to the contrary, 
this rule has even been held applicable in the case of a 
subsequent parol agreement. 
55 Am. Jur. 2d, Mortgages 520, at 508 (1971). 
By agreement, the parties to an equitable mortgage can change the 
conveyance from a mortgage to a deed absolute, abrogating the 
grantor's right of redemption. 
In June, 1990, the Plaintiffs and the Tylers entered into a 
stipulation in which the parties agreed that the Tylers could 
sell the properties and the Plaintiffs would only be entitled to 
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receive any sale proceeds remaining after the debt to the Tylers 
was fully satisfied. R. at 895. If the properties were sold 
for an amount less than the debt, the Plaintiffs would receive 
nothing. R. at 895. If a sale did not occur within 21 months, 
the Plaintiffs agreed that the Tylers would retain sole ownership 
of the properties free of any claim by the Plaintiffs. R. at 
895. The only way the Plaintiffs could recover the properties 
would have been to repurchase the property from the Tylers within 
21 months. R. at 895. 
By this agreement, the Plaintiffs extinguished any interest 
they had in the properties, including a right of redemption, 
securing only a right to the overages, if any. The Tylers 
received sole ownership in the properties subject only to an 
obligation to pay the overages, if any, if a sale occurred within 
21 months. By this agreement, the transaction became an absolute 
conveyance with a right of repurchase. Note, the Plaintiffs, not 
the Tylers, insisted on the stipulation. R. at 1021, 1208-09. 
The Plaintiffs' situation in this case is similar to the 
defendant's situation in Sauer v. Fischer, 225 N.W. 518 (Mich. 
1929). In Sauer, the defendant mortgaged the property in the 
form of an absolute deed. Subsequent purchasers of the property 
sued for quiet title. The trial court ruled that by subsequent 
agreement, the defendant changed the nature of the transaction 
from a mortgage to a deed absolute. The defendant appealed 
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claiming a right of redemption insisting the plaintiffs were 
merely mortgagees. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court stating: 
[i]t is well established that a deed, given as a mortgage, 
may be changed by subsequent agreement of the parties into 
an absolute deed. 
Id. at 519. 
The interesting point of Sauer is the appellate court's 
statement concerning the nature of the transaction between the 
defendant and the original grantees. The court stated: 
[i]f personal liability to pay the debt is extinguished and 
it is optional with the grantor to rescue the property by 
payment, or relinquish it by nonpayment, it is an absolute 
sale with privilege of repurchase, and not a mortgage. 
Id. at 519. 
In this case, the Plaintiffs voluntarily extinguished their 
interest in the properties, securing only a right to receive 
overages, if any, if the properties sold within 21 months. By 
agreement, the Plaintiffs' only possibility for obtaining the 
properties was through repurchase within 21 months. If they 
didn't repurchase the properties and if the properties were not 
sold, the Tylers would retain the properties free of any claim by 
the Plaintiffs. 
The June 13, 1991 agreement is undisputed. As a matter of 
law, the Plaintiffs and the Tylers changed the nature of the 
conveyance from a mortgage to an absolute deed. The Plaintiffs 
secured only a right to receive overages, if any, if a sale 
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occurred within 21 months, and relinquished their interest in the 
properties, including their right of redemption. Hence, summary 
judgment against the Plaintiffs on their first cause of action 
seeking an equity of redemption was proper. Further, summary 
judgment against the Plaintiffs on their second cause of action 
for breach of contract seeking $20,000.00 in exchange for their 
interest in the properties also was proper. 
With respect to their second cause of action, the Plaintiffs 
allege that on August 19, 1991, the parties entered into a new 
agreement as follows: "in exchange for Tylers' agreement to pay 
plaintiffs the sum of $20,000, plaintiffs agreed to relinquish 
their interest ^in order to facilitate the sale of the property 
to Tylers' purchaser.'" See Appellants' Brief at 20-21. 
According to the Plaintiffs, this alleged agreement creates a 
question of fact precluding summary judgment of the Plaintiffs' 
second cause of action for breach of contract. Nevertheless, 
this alleged agreement does not preclude summary judgment. 
It is well settled that "[i]f there is lack of 
consideration, there is no contract." Copper State Leasing 
Company v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Company, 770 P.2d 88, 91 
(Utah 1988). 
For a promise to be legally enforceable, it must be 
supported by consideration. Consideration is an act or 
promise, bargained for and given in exchange for a promise. 
Promises made by a party pursuant to a bilateral contract to 
do an act or to forbear from doing an act that would be 
detrimental to the promisor or beneficial to the promisee 
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may constitute the consideration for the other's promise. 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc.. 
706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). 
Here, the Plaintiffs allege that in exchange for the Tylers' 
promise to pay the Plaintiffs $20,000.00, the Plaintiffs' 
promised to relinquish their interest in the properties. See 
Appellants' Brief at 20-21. However, since, by stipulation, the 
Plaintiffs had already relinquished any interest they had in the 
properties, retaining only a right to overages, if any, the 
Plaintiffs' alleged promise on August 19, 1991 to relinquish 
their interest in the properties could not support the Tylers' 
alleged promise to pay the Plaintiffs $20,000.00. R. at 895, 
1024-27. Since the Tylers' alleged promise was not supported by 
consideration, the alleged agreement is unenforceable. Summary 
judgment on the Plaintiffs' second cause of action for breach of 
contract was, therefore, proper. 
C. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE PLAINTIFFS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO 
ASSERT AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTIES. 
Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. See Beckstead v. Deseret Roofing Co. Inc., 831 
P.2d 130 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
After defaulting on their payments, the Plaintiffs waived 
their right to redeem, agreeing that the Tylers could sell the 
properties or, after 21 months, keep them free of any claim by 
Plaintiffs. R. at 895, 1024-27. The Plaintiffs secured only a 
18 
right to receive overages, if any, if the properties were sold 
within 21 months. R. at 895, 1024-27. 
The doctrine of estoppel operates to prevent the Plaintiffs 
from reasserting a right to redeem where the Tylers and Limb have 
relied on the Plaintiffs' waiver of that right. The elements of 
estoppel are: 
(I) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one 
party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) 
reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken or 
not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the 
second party that would result from allowing the first party 
to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, 
or failure to act. 
S&G Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 742 (Utah 
1996) . 
The Tylers relied to their detriment on the Plaintiffs' 
waiver of their right to redeem by selling the properties to Mr. 
Limb and transferring the properties by warranty deed. The 
Plaintiffs are estopped from now revoking their waiver and 
bringing an action which reasserts that right. The facts 
material to waiver and estoppel are undisputed. Accordingly, 
summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' first and second causes of 
action was proper on these grounds as well. 
D. THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF UNCLEAN 
HANDS. 
Summary judgment should also be affirmed on the doctrine of 
unclean hands. Although the district court did not rely on this 
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principle for entering summary judgment, it is clearly 
established that summary judgment should be affirmed on any legal 
basis available to the district court, even if not relied upon by 
the district court in granting summary judgment. See Town of 
Alta v, Ben Hame Corp, 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992). 
The doctrine of unclean hands operates to require a party 
requesting equity to do equity. Courts uniformly hold that a 
party whose conduct has been inequitable is not entitled to 
obtain equity. 
The Plaintiffs claim to an equity of redemption is naturally 
a claim in equity to which the doctrine of unclean hands applies. 
Here, the Plaintiffs successfully defrauded the bankruptcy court, 
the bankruptcy trustee and the bankruptcy creditors by 
disclaiming all interest in the properties. Such conduct, as a 
matter of law, bars the Plaintiffs from now maintaining a claim 
for an equity of redemption against the Tylers. 
POINT II 
LIMB'S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE 
COURT AND THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS 
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
A. THE MOTION WAS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
The reason for the doctrine of standing was explained by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Terracor v. The Utah Board of State Lands 
& Forrestry, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986): 
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The doctrine or [sic] standing is intended to assure the 
procedural integrity of judicial adjudications by requiring 
that the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient interest in 
the subject matter of the dispute and sufficient adverseness 
that the legal and factual issues which must be resolved 
will be thoroughly explored. 
Id. at 798. 
In Terracor, the Court referred to three general standards 
for determining whether a litigant has standing. First, the 
"plaintiff must be able to show that he has suffered some 
distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in 
the outcome of the legal dispute." Second, "if a plaintiff does 
not have standing under the first criterion, he may have standing 
if no one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case 
and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that 
particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issue." Third, 
"even though standing is not found to exist under the first two 
criteria, a plaintiff may nonetheless have standing if the issues 
are unique and of such great public importance that they ought to 
be decided in furtherance of the public interest." Id. at 798. 
The doctrine of standing primarily applies to a person's 
ability to bring a lawsuit. Nevertheless, Limb satisfied the 
requirements for standing set forth by the Utah Supreme Court. 
The first general standard applies in this case. Limb was a 
party to the action because the Plaintiffs pled him as a party 
and asserted claims against him. As a party in the action and as 
the owner of the properties, Limb had a personal stake in the 
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outcome of the case and, therefore, a personal stake in any 
motion brought in the action, especially a motion to dismiss. 
At the time Limb brought the motion to dismiss, 
approximately 14 months had passed since summary judgment was 
granted on two of the Plaintiffs' three causes of action. R. at 
697-99. Although summary judgment was granted denying the 
Plaintiffs' equity of redemption, the lis pendens filed against 
the properties continued to cloud Limb's title. R. at 697-99. 
Limb's motion requested that the remaining claims be dismissed 
for lack of prosection thereby creating a final appealable order. 
R. at 697-99. If the Motion to Dismiss were denied, Limb 
requested, in the alternative, that the summary judgment order be 
certified as a final judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. R. at 697-99. After a hearing on the 
matter, the district court granted the Motion to Dismiss stating: 
[T]he court finds that the summary judgment was filed in May 
of 1995 and nothing further has been done on this case. The 
court grants the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute 
and orders the summary judgment certified as final so that 
appeal can go forward. 
R. at 715. 
Plaintiffs suggest the trial court granted the alternative 
remedy before granting the dismissal and therefore, the moment 
the trial court granted the alternative remedy, Limb no longer 
had standing to pursue the dismissal. See Appellants' Brief at 
29. The trial court's minute entry clearly demonstrates that the 
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trial court granted the motion to dismiss first, and as part of 
the dismissal ordered the summary judgment certified as final for 
appeal. R. at 715. 
In addition, Limb's standing to bring the motion is 
determined at the time the motion was filed, not in the middle of 
the court's oral decree. Once the motion was before the court, 
the court could rule on it. Furthermore, even if a motion to 
dismiss is not brought by a party, the court can still dismiss 
the matter on its own motion. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss 
was properly before the trial court. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE 
MOTION. 
The district court has broad discretion in dismissing 
actions for failure to prosecute and that decision will not be 
disturbed without an abuse of discretion and a likelihood 
injustice has occurred. Hartford, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah App. 
1994); Charlie Brown Constr. Co., 740 P.2d at 1370. 
The Plaintiffs argue that the court abused its discretion by 
granting the motion to dismiss without giving notice to the 
Plaintiffs and without sufficient grounds. See Appellants' Brief 
at 29-30. However, the record is clear that the Plaintiffs had 
notice of the motion to dismiss and simply ineffectively opposed 
the motion. R. at 705-08, 711-12, 727-28, 746-49. 
Limb filed his motion to dismiss on July 22, 1996. R. at 
697-99. Despite Limb dedicating four pages to factual and legal 
23 
support of the motion, the Plaintiffs filed an objection to the 
motion containing only two sentences. R. at 705. The 
Plaintiffs did, however, request a hearing for September 9, 1996. 
R. at 707-08. Clearly, the Plaintiffs' failure to provide 
factual and legal support in its written objection to the motion 
meant the Plaintiffs would need to present competent oral 
argument at the time of hearing if it expected the court to be 
aware of any facts necessary to consider denying the motion. 
More than a month before the hearing, the court continued 
the hearing for two weeks. R. at 711-12. Nevertheless, the 
Plaintiffs' attorney did not appear for the hearing, sending in 
his place an associate. R. at 715, 746-49. The associate did 
not assert any justification for the Plaintiffs' inaction in 
moving the case forward in the 14 months since summary judgment. 
R. at 728, 747. In fact, the Plaintiffs' counsel acknowledges 
sending the associate without briefing him on the case. See 
Appellants' Brief at 12. Without any justification for 
inactivity and faced with the prejudice Limb continued to suffer 
by the delay, the court granted the motion to dismiss. The 
Plaintiffs argue that the court abused its discretion granting 
the motion; however, the Plaintiffs fail to offer any evidence 
tending to show that the court's decision was without support in 
the record. In fact, the record clearly evidences that in 
response to the motion, the Plaintiffs failed to present the 
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court any justification for the delay and continued prejudice to 
Limb. It's not an abuse of the court's discretion when a party 
refuses to diligently advocate its interests. A court is not 
required to protect a party from the party's own indolence. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' RULE 60(B) MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT. 
The Plaintiffs listed as an issue for appeal the district 
court's denial of Plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion; however, the 
Plaintiffs have failed to brief this issue on appeal. It is 
uniformly held that an appellate court will decline to consider 
an issue that has not been briefed: 
It is well established that an appellate court will decline 
to consider an argument that a party has failed to 
adequately brief. See State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256, 263 
[*15] (Ct. App. 1995), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 
1996); State v. Wareham, 772 P. 2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) 
(declining to address issue where "brief wholly lacks legal 
analysis and authority to support . . . argument"). Because 
of inadequate analysis, we decline to address Paul 
Valcarce's claim on appeal. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 Utah Adv. Rep 68, 15 (Ct. App. 
1997) . 
Similarly, Plaintiffs' claim regarding the trial court's refusal 
to set aside the judgment should not be addressed on this appeal. 
Even if this Court decides to consider this issue, it is 
clear that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
denying the Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. Rule 
60(b) provides that a judgment may be set aside on the following 
grounds: 
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(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could 
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; 
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has 
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside the Judgment failed to 
offer any of the grounds listed in Rule 60(b). R. at 726-29. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs and their attorney failed to appear at 
the hearing and offer additional support for their motion. R. 
at 782. 
The only basis alleged for the claimed relief from judgment 
was: "Plaintiffs submit that had the court been aware of the 
ongoing negotiations and good faith efforts which were being made 
to resolve the outstanding claims, the court would have never 
ordered them dismissed for failure to prosecute." R. at 728. 
Plaintiffs' supposition that the court did not take into account 
all circumstances does not address the possible grounds listed in 
Rule 60(b) and, therefore, does not constitute grounds to set 
aside the judgment. Plaintiffs' motion to set aside was, 
therefore, properly denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's granting of summary judgment against 
Plaintiffs on their first and second causes of action was proper. 
The trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' third cause of action 
for failure to prosecute and refusal to set aside the judgment 
was also property. Defendants respectfully request this Court 
affirm the decisions of the trial court. 
DATED THIS 27th day of April, 1998. 
DIXON & TRUMAN, a P.C. 
NATHAN K. FISHER, ESQ. 
Attorneys for Defendant Tylers 
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Doug Terry 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
150 North 200 East 
Suite 202 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Ronald Russell 
Attorney for Mr. Limb 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
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APPENDIX 1 
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May 1, 1991 
Blaine Walker 
1414 East Murray Holiday Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Dear Blaine: 
As per your request, I am writing to give you a market value of 
properties owned by Tim Tyler, which have been involved with the 
Penn Smith bankruptcy. As you are aware, there are 4 separate 
properties; 2 RV lots & 2 industrial lots. We have had offers on 
these properties in the last 30 days, one of which was submitted to 
you, but the time frame made it impossible for the court to perform 
on it. 
Concerning values, the lots in the RV park would be $11,750 each. 
The offer submitted to you was for $11,750. 
The industrial ground is two parcels, 1.71 acres and 1.25 acre. We 
had an offer from a local contractor at $40,000 for the 1.75 and 
$30,000 for the 1.25 piece. Because of the problem with the RV lot 
delivering title and expediency the sales were not consummated. 
TjpYoiii>ft^ iiMwn f^cih^^nnit>a 1..^ n l M^F - o f U a U ^ a ^ 
with a net of about $80,000, after closing costs. Mr. Tyler would 
get about what is his out of pocket layout to Penn Smith. 
These are the highest and best offers we have had in a very long 
time, maybe not again for sometime to come. I hope you can help us 
with this so we can get on with future sales. 
Sincerely, 
Sam Sampson 
Associate Broker 
